Cryptocurrency arrived with two promises: a new form of money that could enable faster, cheaper cross-border payments; and financial autonomy outside traditional banks. Instead, for millions of people in Canada and the United States, crypto has too often become the preferred payment rail for criminals who exploit that very autonomy. Over the last several years, fraudsters have refined techniques that mix classic telecommunications fraud, romance and investment deception, and modern blockchain tooling into highly profitable, transnational scams. The losses are enormous, the tactics are ruthless, and the investigators — strapped, jurisdictionally limited and often playing catch-up — struggle to keep pace. Recent law-enforcement and industry reports make the scale clear: billions of dollars flow through these schemes, and many campaigns are run from outside North America, using call centres, money-mule networks and crypto-onramps that cross continents.
This article explains how these scams work, where many of them are run from, why Canadians and Americans are such frequent targets, examples and case studies from recent investigations, why policing and prosecution lag the criminals, and practical steps to reduce harm.
Why crypto is attractive to scammers
Several features of cryptocurrency make it uniquely attractive for fraud:
• Irreversible, near-instant transfers. Once a victim sends crypto to a wallet, reversing the payment is generally impossible without cooperation from whoever controls the receiving wallet or exchange. That creates urgency for scammers and leaves victims little recourse.
• Global, permissionless rails. Crypto moves across borders almost instantly. Criminals operating in one country can accept funds from victims in dozens of others without relying on local banks or cleared wire rails.
• Pseudonymity and opaque conversion paths. While blockchains are public ledgers, linking a wallet to an individual requires work. Scammers layer transfers across many wallets, mixers, and centralized exchange withdrawals to obscure flows and profit. Sophisticated laundering networks can convert crypto into fiat in countries with weak AML (anti-money-laundering) enforcement or corrupt intermediaries.
• Social engineering + technology. Scams combine high-pressure persuasion — “act now or lose your chance” — with technical tricks (phishing sites, fake apps, remote access, SIM swaps). Crypto’s self-custody norms help fraudsters: victims are asked to “move funds into our private wallet” or “install this trading app,” which enables the theft.
These features do not mean crypto is inherently criminal, but they do mean criminals can profit faster and with fewer procedural friction points than with traditional bank fraud.
Common scam types that target Canadians and Americans
Criminals adapt old fraud templates to the crypto world. Below are the major types law enforcement and industry monitors now spotlight.
1. Investment scams and “pig-butchering”
Criminals cultivate victims — often by romance or social media contact — then “teach” them about investing. After a small initial deposit that appears to grow, the victim is pressured to invest more. Withdrawals are blocked or require “verification fees,” and victims ultimately lose large sums. Chainalysis and other analysts have shown that these “pig-butchering” schemes accounted for large portions of scamming revenue in recent years.
2. Fake exchanges and trading platforms
Scammers set up convincing websites or mobile apps that look like legitimate exchanges. Victims are encouraged to deposit crypto; the platform may show fake balances and fabricated trading history. When withdrawal is attempted, excuses, fees, or identity checks prevent funds from leaving.
3. Romance scams that segue into crypto
Scammers form emotional relationships and convince victims to invest in “exclusive” crypto opportunities or to transfer funds as a sign of trust. The FBI/IC3 reports that older adults are disproportionately harmed by certain fraud types, including those that use romance as an entry vector.
4. Tech-support and impersonation scams
Victims receive calls or messages impersonating banks, government agencies, or “support” from major tech companies. The scammer claims the victim’s accounts are compromised and instructs them to move money to a “safe” crypto wallet or to buy crypto gift cards and send codes. Call-centre networks often coordinate these campaigns across borders.
5. SIM-swap and account takeover
Criminals gain control of a victim’s phone number through SIM-swap attacks and use it to reset exchange passwords, drain wallets, or intercept two-factor authentication (2FA) messages.
6. Rug pulls, token fraud, and NFTs
Fraudsters create tokens or NFT collections, pump them with hype, then abandon the project and drain liquidity — leaving buyers with worthless assets. These schemes often use social media influencers (paid or duped) to amplify the reach quickly.
Where do these scams come from? The problem of attribution and hotspots
When a user asks “where do the scams originate?”, the truthful answer is: from many places. Criminal fraud operations are transnational by design; they use infrastructure across multiple countries to operate, launder, and cash out. Blanket statements that “all scams come from X, Y, Z” are both inaccurate and dangerous. That said, investigations do frequently point to organized call-centre and criminal hubs in certain jurisdictions, and large international takedowns indicate the problem is global.
Important, recent patterns and findings:
• Call centres and organised operations in South Asia (India) and parts of Southeast Asia. In multiple recent investigations, Indian law enforcement agencies (CBI and local police) have dismantled call-centre networks accused of targeting U.S. and Canadian victims with investment and impersonation scams. These operations often used VoIP, toll-free numbers, and crypto onramps to move funds. For example, investigations in Delhi-Noida uncovered groups that allegedly took millions of dollars in Bitcoin from elderly victims in North America.
• Organised operations based in Europe and Africa used for laundering and victim acquisition. Europol and partner agencies have taken down networks that used sophisticated investment scams, sometimes involving European-based shell companies and money-mule structures. Europol’s press releases describe international crackdowns on multimillion-euro investment fraud rings that targeted victims across the globe.
• West Africa and “romance/scam” syndicates. Historically, many romance and advance-fee fraud operations have been associated with West African syndicates, though modern operations are often distributed and use collaborators in many countries. Researchers caution against stereotyping: criminal actors exploit global communication platforms and often subcontract tasks across countries.
• East Asia and cyber-enabled fraud. Complex cybercrime rings with ties to East Asian jurisdictions have been implicated in certain hacking, social-engineering, and token-fraud operations. Again, attribution varies by case and requires cautious phrasing.
In short: investigators commonly find that scams affecting Canadians and Americans are coordinated across multiple countries — call centres or call lists may be in one country, wallets and laundering channels in others, and on-the-ground cash-out facilitators somewhere else. These cross-border linkages complicate policing and prosecution.
Case studies: recent takedowns and investigations
FBI/IC3 annual findings: the headline scale of losses
The FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) and the FBI’s reporting on crypto fraud have highlighted dramatic increases in losses tied to cryptocurrency. The agency has reported billions in losses in recent reporting cycles and has emphasized that investment fraud (with cryptocurrency references) was a leading driver of those losses. Those statistics highlight the mass scale of the problem facing North American consumers.
Chainalysis and the “pig-butchering” phenomenon
Blockchain investigators have tracked rapid growth in “pig-butchering” and other large, organized scamming operations that yielded billions on chain. Chainalysis’s research shows both that scamming revenues have fluctuated year to year and that sophisticated social-engineering campaigns are by far among the most lucrative. Their work also documents common laundering patterns that complicate tracing.
India: call-centre busts targeting US/Canadian victims
Indian investigative agencies have repeatedly arrested individuals connected to call-centre style scams that targeted North American victims. Reporting has documented cases where suspects allegedly ran operations from cities such as Mumbai, Pune, Delhi and other areas, using spoofed numbers and VoIP to impersonate U.S. officials or financial institutions and directing victims to transfer funds in crypto. Indian authorities have worked with foreign partners in some of these investigations. These cases highlight how a local facility can operate globally thanks to internet telephony and crypto onramps.
Europol and multinational takedowns
European authorities have led multiple cross-border operations to dismantle multimillion-euro fraud rings. Europol’s public cases show how law-enforcement cooperation can arrest suspects, seize assets and disrupt operations — but such takedowns are expensive, slow, and often net only a fraction of the criminal proceeds.
Why law enforcement struggles to keep up
Even with the best intentions and growing technical capabilities, police and prosecutors face structural and operational obstacles:
-
Jurisdictional fragmentation. A fraudster in one country can target a victim in another, launder funds through a third, and cash out in a fourth. Each step may require a separate legal request, translation, and cooperation from foreign agencies.
-
Resource constraints and backlogs. Agencies like the FBI, RCMP, CBI and others prioritize based on victim impact and criminal sophistication; the sheer volume of complaints — tens of thousands per year in North America — overwhelms capacity. The IC3 receives thousands of crypto-related complaints annually, and many cases require specialist blockchain tracing teams.
-
Speed of criminal operations vs speed of legal process. Crypto transfers happen in minutes; international mutual legal assistance requests (MLATs) can take months. By the time an order arrives, the funds are moved or converted.
-
Cross-border differences in law and enforcement priorities. Some jurisdictions have less stringent AML frameworks, slower regulator responses, or fewer resources to prioritize cyber fraud. That makes them attractive for criminals seeking conversion and cash-out services.
-
Evolving tactics. Scammers continuously change scripts, use new platforms (decentralized exchanges, anonymous mixers), and fragment operations to frustrate tracing.
-
Victim silence and shame. Many victims don’t report immediately because of embarrassment, which delays investigations and lets criminals move money.
These constraints do not mean law enforcement is inactive — the recent multinational takedowns show progress — but they do explain why investigations often feel reactive and piecemeal relative to the scale of criminal activity.
Who gets targeted — why Canadians and Americans appear so vulnerable
A combination of demographic, technological and cultural factors explains why North Americans are heavily targeted:
• High per-capita wealth and availability of disposable funds. Criminals prioritize victims who can pay large sums.
• Older populations with digital literacy gaps. The FBI reports older adults (60+) report high total losses on certain fraud types; scammers often target perceived vulnerabilities in this group.• High usage of social networks and online marketplaces. Scammers use dating apps, Telegram, WhatsApp, Facebook, and increasingly, Web3 communities to identify and groom victims.
• Trust in “tech solutions.” Some victims assume a crypto wallet or startup is “legit” if it uses technical language, proprietary dashboards, or Instagram influencers.
• Lack of awareness about irreversible crypto transfers. Many people do not understand that a crypto transfer is effectively final and irreversible without the recipient’s cooperation.
Taken together, these create a lucrative target set for organized fraud groups.
The international dimension: why naming countries matters — and why it can be misleading
The user’s prompt noted that “so many scams all originating in Africa, Taiwan, China, Russia and other countries other than Canada and the USA” and asked for examples from India. It’s important to treat such claims carefully.
• Accurate: Many high-profile scams and call-centre operations have indeed been traced to organizations based in India, parts of Africa, Eastern Europe, and East/Southeast Asia. Recent arrests and press reporting document networks in India and elsewhere that targeted U.S. and Canadian victims.
• Caveat: Criminal operations are often transnational and diffuse — parts of the scheme (data harvesting, call-centre staff, money laundering) may be in different countries. Saying “all scams originate in X” is usually incorrect and risks stereotyping whole nations or communities. Law enforcement and researchers therefore speak about networks, not nationalities.
We can responsibly report that certain countries or regions frequently appear in investigations because of structural factors (e.g., inexpensive labour to staff fraudulent call centres, lax enforcement in some jurisdictions, existing organized crime networks), but these are systemic explanations — not a moral indictment of nations or their people.
Concrete examples and reported schemes (summarized)
Below are short summaries of publicized investigations and their lessons:
• Delhi-Noida crypto investment ring (India): Indian agencies uncovered groups accused of collecting substantial Bitcoin from elderly U.S. and Canadian victims using fake investment platforms. The alleged operators used persuasion, account control, and crypto wallets to move funds. This case shows how a domestic call-centre can scale a cross-border investment fraud scheme. www.ndtv.com
• Mumbai/Pune network dismantled by CBI: Reported CBI raids linked to rings impersonating federal agencies and funneling payments into Bitcoin and other crypto; seizures included crypto assets and devices. These investigations emphasize the variety of criminal scripts — from impersonation to outright theft — that end in crypto.
• Europol multi-country takedowns: European cooperation has led to arrests in investment fraud cases that used fake trading platforms and complex laundering routes; these operations often targeted victims across continents. Such takedowns are examples of law enforcement converging across borders, but they also underline how much coordination is necessary to disrupt criminal networks.
• FBI/IC3 reporting: The FBI’s reports quantify the problem for U.S. victims and show shifts in scam types and losses. That data helps investigators and policy makers allocate resources and craft public warnings.
What victims and platforms can do — immediate and practical protections
Individuals and platforms both have roles to reduce harm.
For individuals (practical steps)
-
Skepticism about unsolicited investment offers. If someone you met online offers a private, “guaranteed” crypto investment, treat it as extremely suspicious.
-
Never send crypto to someone who insists on secrecy. Crypto transfers are rarely reversible.
-
Use hardware wallets or reputable custodial services for large holdings. Self-custody is powerful but also carries responsibility.
-
Enable strong 2FA and avoid SMS-based 2FA where possible. Use an authenticator app or hardware token.
-
Don’t share remote-access controls or give strangers permission to move funds. Tech-support scams commonly use remote access to install malware or exfiltrate credentials.
-
Report quickly. File complaints with local law enforcement, the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre (CAFC) in Canada, and IC3 in the U.S. Early reporting can sometimes freeze accounts and help tracing.
For exchanges and platforms
• AML and KYC vigilance. Stronger checks on fiat-crypto onramps and rapid suspicious activity detection can make it harder to cash out stolen funds.
• Deposit/withdrawal delays and manual review for large transfers. A small delay to verify unusual withdrawal patterns can block some frauds.
• Rapid cooperation with law enforcement. Faster seizure/holds on accounts where a court order exists can prevent dissipated proceeds.
• User education and red-flag alerts. Platforms can proactively inform users about common scams and create easy reporting flows.
For policymakers and international cooperation
• Harmonize AML standards. Closing gaps in onramps and exchanges across jurisdictions raises the cost for criminals.
• Faster mutual legal assistance. Modernized MLATs and better real-time channels for evidence and transaction tracing will speed investigations.
• Capacity building in high-risk jurisdictions. Supporting law enforcement in hubs where call centres or cash-out services operate can produce results.
• Consumer protections that recognize crypto’s irreversibility. Rules that require clearer warnings and limits on purchases in some contexts may reduce impulsive victimization.
Why public education still matters most
Technology changes, but human psychology doesn’t. The core of many crypto scams is social engineering — urgency, authority, and the lure of easy gains. Educating potential victims about those tactics, making reporting frictionless, and raising public awareness about irreversible crypto transfers are arguably the single most effective short-term interventions.
That education must be culturally tailored for older adults, immigrant communities, and others who may be targeted — and it must be continually refreshed as scammers shift platforms (from Facebook to Telegram to Discord to emerging Web3 forums).
Conclusion — a path forward
Cryptocurrency did not invent fraud, but it handed criminals a faster, more borderless payment rail and a layer of complexity that slows detection and recovery. The evidence from FBI/IC3 reports, blockchain analytics, and numerous international investigations shows the totality of harm: billions lost, large organized rings operating across continents, and call-centre and on-the-ground networks that can spring up quickly.
At the same time, multinational law-enforcement cooperation and blockchain analytics have produced successful takedowns and recoveries. These wins show what’s possible when agencies, industry and civil society collaborate. But the scale of the challenge requires more: faster legal cooperation, stronger AML controls at onramps, continued public education, and better consumer safeguards.
If you live in Canada or the U.S., the practical takeaway is simple but urgent: treat unsolicited crypto investment offers like a probable scam; use secure custody and authentication; report suspicions to the CAFC or IC3; and spread awareness to family and friends (especially older relatives). For policymakers and platforms, the imperative is to make it harder for criminals to convert stolen crypto into spendable cash.
The promise of blockchain and crypto is real — innovative payment rails, programmable money and new financial models — but that promise will be realized only if regulators, platforms and the public together make it costly and risky for fraudsters to exploit those rails.
Selected sources and further reading
-
FBI, “2023 Cryptocurrency Fraud Report” and related IC3 materials (annual reporting on crypto-related complaints and losses).
-
Chainalysis, 2024 Crypto Crime reporting and analysis of scamming patterns (including pig-butchering trends).
-
Europol press releases and international takedown reports detailing cross-border investment fraud investigations.
-
Reporting on Indian investigations into call-centre crypto fraud targeting U.S./Canadian victims (CBI and local police actions).
-
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) reporting and Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre background on fraud prevention and reporting.